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1

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent, :
v.

:

NATHANIAL LEE BELL,

;

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 890623-CA

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of assault by a
prisoner, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-102.5 (1978).

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the

appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The issues presented in this appeal are:
1) Was sufficient evidence presented at trial to
sustain defendant's conviction for assault by a prisoner?
2)

Did the trial court commit reversible error in its

instruction to the jury on reasonable doubt?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The relevant text of any applicable constitutional
provisions and statutes for a determination of this case are set
forth in the body of this brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Nathaniel Lee Bell, was charged with assault
by a prisoner, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (1978) (R. 15-16).

On September 26, 1989, a

jury trial commenced before the Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen,
Judge by assignment, Fifth Judicial District Court, Iron County,
Utah (R. 36). The same day, the jury returned a verdict of
guilty as charged (R. 38-39; T. 121-22).

Defendant waived time

for sentencing, requesting immediate imposition of sentence (R.
39; T. 124). Defendant was sentenced to the statutory
indeterminate term of zero to five years, to run concurrently
with any other sentences defendant was then serving (R. 39, 6972; T. 128). Defendant filed his notice of appeal on October 17,
1989 (R. 75).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant, Nathaniel Lee Bell, is a convicted felon
who, in 1989, was serving sentences in the Utah State Prison for
aggravated burglary and aggravated sexual assault (T. 74-5).
From November, 1988 to May, 1989, defendant was housed in the
Iron County-Utah State Correctional Facility in Cedar City, Utah,
a regional housing facility of the prison (T. 74-75).
On April 13, 1989, while in the Iron County Facility,
defendant and several other inmates were playing handball.
Defendant's partner was inmate Dan Richardson; their opponents
were inmates Nicholas Baughn (Banner) and Carry Hartmann (T. 30).
These same inmates had played against each other several times
previously, oftern resulting in arguments, especially between
defendant and Hartmann (T. 40, 53, 80).
-2-

On the day in question, the game had begun in its usual
manner, with some verbal arguments developing as the game
progressed (T. 31). Typical of the previous games, defendant and
Hartmann began to continuously disagree with each other, both
having "a habit of being overbearing on the court" (T. 30). Both
were claiming that the other was "in the way", blocking any
opportunity to return the ball (T. 54, 84). The arguments became
more heated until finally defendant told Hartmann, "You get in my
way again . . . come hell or high water, I'm running over your
f

ing ass" (T. 32, 55). Immediately after this statement, the

ball was put back into play.
serve.

Hartmann was to return defendant's

Nicholas Baughn (Banner) observed:
Mr. Hartmann had run up to hit the ball,
which he did. He hit the ball, but in so
doing his inertia, his forward inertia in
hitting that ball caused him to brush up
against the back of Nathaniel Bell. Mr. Bell
was, you know, obviously, standing there
watching the former wall, waiting for the
ball to come back. In handball you don't
turn around and look behind you. So Gary
[sic], when he returned the ball, his inertia
just brushed up against the back of Mr. Bell,
and he sort of brushed off the back of him
and kind of bumped into the side wall.

(T. 33, 55). According to Mr. Banner, defendant then came up
"right along side [of Hartmann] and hit him, and hit him right in
the jaw" (T. 34). Banner continued:
I was dumbfounded. I was shocked.
[Defendant] hit him, and I saw Mr. Hartmann's
eyes, he was knocked out on his feet. I
mean, his eyes just went around in his head,
and they were glazed over, and he just fell
like along, he just fell straight back and
hit his head on the gymnasium floor.

-3-

(T. 34). As Hartmann laid on the floor, Banner saw "blood
bubbling out of his mouth, and I started to see a pool of blood
forming around his head" (T. 35). Medics were called and
Hartmann, still unconscious, was transported by ambulance to the
hospital (T. 35, 37).
Banner's account of the incident was consistent with
the victim's recollection.

Carry Hartmann testified that in

going for the ball, he lightly touched defendant on the back
(T. 56). Hartmann said "excuse me" and then may have hit the
wall (T. 59). From that point on, he could not recall anything
until he regained consciousness in the ambulance while being
transported to the hospital (T. 56-57).
Defendant testified on his own behalf (T. 73-99).

He

admitted that he had been "bending the rules" in playing the
handball game by not giving his opponents, Banner and Hartmann, a
fair opportunity to return the ball (T. 84). He claimed that
both he and Hartmann had been doing this to each other throughout
the game (T. 84). Defendant testified that he had been
previously stabbed in prison and was especially concerned about
receiving any blows to the abdomen (T. 77). Defendant claimed
that as Hartmann went for the ball, Hartmann hit defendant in the
stomach, causing defendant to bend forward (T. 85). Defendant
responded "without thinking" and hit Hartmann in the mouth and
jaw area with a closed fist (T. 85, 99). Hartmann fell to the
floor, his eyes rolling back, unconscious (T. 86). Defendant
asserted that he did not intend to harm Hartmann in hitting him.
Rather,

when [Hartmann] did this, I really didn't
know what else, I do know that my trick had
worked. I had turned the aggression around.
I had caused him to be more angry at me than
I was at him. I had frustrated him because
what he was doing to me, I was doing to him,
and it was more frustrating.
(T. 92). Instead of Hartmann falling down unconscious, defendant
had "hoped that he would at least have, was looking at me, that
he would at least block the punch, and then we would have had a
confrontation.

And that's what I wanted" (T. 98).

Despite defendant's claim that Hartmann had initially
hit him, no other witnesses corroborated this statement.

Both

the victim, Hartmann, and his partner, Banner, denied that
Hartmann had ever hit defendant (T. 33, 40, 57). Another inmate,
Frank Mills, who was the lineman in the game, could not "recall
[Hartmann] hitting Mr. Bell, although I'm not certain he didn't";
however, he did hear Hartmann say "excuse me" as he went pass
defendant to return the ball (T. 45, 47, 51). Mills further
testified that Hartmann had been standing still when defendant
hit him, causing Hartmann to lose consciousness before even
hitting the floor (T. 46, 50). When Hartmann hit the floor,
[h]e was shaking and making some odd sounds
with his mouth and nasal passages, and he was
bleeding from the mouth and nose, and in the
matter of seconds was bleeding from his rear
portion of his head.
(T. 46).
The jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged (T.
121-22).

Against the advice of his attorney, defendant waived

time for sentencing, asking the court to impose sentence
immediately (T. 124). Defendant was sentenced to the statutory

term of zero to five years, to run concurrently with any other
sentences defendant was then serving (T. 128).
Other facts, relating to the jury instructions given,
will be discussed as appropriate to the argument.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The evidence presented at trial, together with all
reasonable inferences, is sufficient to sustain defendant's
conviction for assault by a prisoner.
The trial court properly instructed the jury as to the
state's burden of proving all elements charged beyond a
reasonable doubt.

The court's instruction as to what constituted

reasonable doubt was correct under Utah case law.

Further, any

error in the instruction would be harmless in light of other jury
instructions given and the overwhelming nature of the evidence
against defendant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL TOGETHER WITH
ALL REASONABLE INFERENCES IS SUFFICIENT TO
SUSTAIN DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR ASSAULT BY
A PRISONER.
Defendant contends that the evidence adduced at trial
is insufficient to support his conviction of assault by a
prisoner as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (1978) which
reads:
Any prisoner who commits assault, intending
to cause bodily injury, is guilty of a felony
of the third degree.
Assault is defined under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (1978) as
being:

(a) An attempt, with unlawful force or
violence, to do bodily injury to another; or
(b) A threat, accompanied by a show of
immediate force or violence, to do bodily
injury to another.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-101 (1978) further defines "prisoner";
however, here there is no dispute as to defendant's status as a
prisoner.

The jury was fully advised as to these definitions and

each requisite element of the offense.

(See R. 49-68, Court's

Instructions to the Jury, Instructions No. 5, 6 and 7). No issue
has been raised on appeal as to the adequacy of the instructions,
but for, the reasonable doubt instruction which will be discussed
in Point II of this brief.
The standard for review of a sufficiency of the
evidence challenge is well-established by the Utah appellate
courts.
[T]he evidence and the reasonable inferences
which may be drawn therefrom must be viewed
in the light most favorable to the jury
verdict. A jury conviction is reversed for
insufficient evidence only when the evidence,
so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the crime of which he
was convicted. . . .
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989).

Accord State

v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

Further,

since a jury is in the best position to give "proper weight to
the peripheral nature of [any] contradictory testimony," State v.
Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, 28 (Utah Ct. App. 1988):
It is not this court's duty to measure
conflicting evidence or the credibility of
witnesses. That responsibility belongs
strictly to the trier of fact. "It is the
exclusive function of the jury to weigh the

evidence and to determine the credibility of
the witnesses. So long as there is some
evidence, including reasonable inferences,
from which findings of all requisite elements
of the crime can reasonably be made, [the
court's] inquiry stops." . . .
Id. at 27 (citations omitted), quoting State v. Booker, 709 P.2d
342, 345 (Utah 1985).

Accord State v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475

(Utah 1989) .
Turning to the facts established at trial and their
reasonable inferences, it is clear that defendant, while a
prisoner, stuck the victim, Carry Hartmann, causing him bodily
injury (T. 34-35, 46, 56, 85-86).

It is equally clear that prior

to defendant's hitting of Hartmann, the two were involved in a
verbal argument in which defendant threatened that he would "run
over" Hartmann the next time they came in contact during the game
(T. 32, 44, 55). Immediately thereafter, when Hartmann touched
defendant, defendant hit the victim with such force that he
knocked him unconscious with a single blow (T. 34-35, 46, 56, 8586).

While defendant claimed that he never intended Hartmann to

hit the floor, splitting open his head and causing bleeding, the
nature and strength of the blow caused Hartmann injury before he
ever hit the floor.

It knocked him unconscious while on his feet

(T. 34, 46). Under the facts, there is amble evidence to support
the jury's conclusion that defendant struck Hartmann, intending
to cause him bodily injury.
The only element remaining is whether defendant hit
Hartmann unlawfully, that is, without legal justification.
defendant's request, the court instructed the jury that:

At

A person is justified in using force against
another when and to the extent that he
reasonably believes that such force is
necessary to defend himself against such
other's imminent use of unlawful force.
(R. 60, Instruction No. 12; Compare R. 35, defendant's Requested
Instruction No. 3 ). While defendant claimed that he hit
Hartmann only in response to Hartmann's striking him, the
evidence was to the contrary.

No one, other than defendant,

testified to Hartmann hitting defendant.

No one, other than

defendant, testified that the hit was significant enough that
defendant went forward.

Instead, all other witnesses testified

that Hartmann was doing nothing but standing still when hit by
defendant.

Even assuming for the sake of argument that Hartmann

had hit defendant, the jury would still have been justified in
concluding that defendant assaulted Hartmann.

For, even the

defendant admitted that he was attempting to provoke Hartmann, to
make Hartmann sufficiently "frustrated", that a "confrontation"
would occur (T. 92). Defendant was disappointed that Hartmann
was unconscious because defendant could not then continue the
fight (T. 97-98).

Where conflicting evidence exists as to a

claim of self-defense, it is the jury's prerogative to reject the
claim.

State v. Buel, 700 P.2d 701, 703 (Utah 1985).
When the evidence is taken as a whole and the proper

standard of review applied, it is clear that there is more than
sufficient evidence to sustain defendant's assault conviction.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY
AS TO WHAT CONSTITUTES A REASONABLE DOUBT.
Defendant asserts that the trial court committed
reversible error in its instruction to the jury on reasonable
doubt.

However, in making his argument, defendant does not point

to any specific language in the instruction as inaccurate or
incorrect.

Instead, defendant appears to argue that under State

v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1989), any instruction on
reasonable doubt must necessarily include the language that "in
order to convict a Defendant [the jury] must have an abiding
conviction of the Defendant's guilt upon which they would act in
the most critical and irrevocable matters in there [sic] own
affairs" (Br. of App. at 4 ) . Such a position is without merit.
Defendant misconstrues the concerns expressed by the
Utah Supreme Court as to the inclusion in reasonable doubt
instructions of the terms "more weighty affairs of life" and
"mere possibility" or "imaginary doubt".

State v. Ireland, 773

P.2d at 1380, including Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion at
1380-81; State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989), including
concurring opinions of J. Stewart at 1147, and J. Zimmerman at
1149.

For while the Court has directed that these terms not be

utilized, the Court has never mandated that particular language
be included.

State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1380.

Instead, the

standard remains that jury instructions must be construed as a
whole; and, a conviction will be overturned only if a defendant
can show that he was prejudiced by the instruction such that the
outcome of the case would have likely been different.

-i n-

State v.

Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1146, 1149. Accord Holland v. United
States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954) (reasonable doubt instruction
may be misleading standing alone, but acceptable when read as a
whole with other jury instructions); United States v. Hall/ 854
F.2d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 1988) (no constitutional infringement
occurs where instructions as a whole properly instructed the jury
as to defendant's presumption of innocence and the government's
burden of proof).
Further, it is the exclusive province of the trial
court to instruct the jury on relevant law.
Accordingly, the judge may, over the
objection of the defendant's counsel, give
any instruction that is in proper form,
states the law correctly, and does not
prejudice the defendant. State v. Piper, 113
Ariz. 390, 393, 555 P.2d 636, 639 (1976).
However, all instructions are subject to the
general and overreaching rule that the judge
must make it clear to the jury that the
defendant has "no particular burden of proof
but [is] entitled to an acquittal if there
[is] any basis in the evidence from either
side sufficient to create a reasonable doubt
that the defendant [is] guilty of the
offense." State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695
(Utah 1980) . . . .
State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah 1986).
Here, the trial court fully and correctly instructed
the jury that defendant was entitled to the presumption of
innocence (R. 51, Instruction No. 3), that the state carried the
burden of proving all essential elements of the crime charged
(R. 53, Instruction No. 5; R. 54, Instruction No. 6) and that the
state must prove that the defendant acted with the requisite
intent (R. 56, Instruction No. 8). Additionally, the court gave
an "alternative reasonable hypothesis" instruction, entitling
-11-

defendant to an acquittal if there existed two reasonable
interpretations of the evidence (R. 59, Instruction No. 11) and
self-defense instruction (R. 60, Instruction No. 12). Compare
United States v. Alonzo, 681 F.2d 997 (5th Cir.), cert, denied,
459 U.S. 1021 (1982) ("alternative reasonable hypothesis"
instruction unnecessary where reasonable doubt instruction is
given).

Accord United States v. Rucker, 586 F.2d 899 (2d Cir.

1978) (defendant not entitled to "two conclusion" instruction
where the jury is properly instructed on government's burden to
prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt).

Thus, only in the

context of the totality of the instructions, can the reasonable
doubt instruction be judged.
Here, the trial court instructed the jury that:
A reasonable doubt is a fair doubt based
upon reason and common sense and one which
reasonable men and women would have after a
consideration of all the evidence or lack of
evidence in the case.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that
degree of proof that satisfies the mind and
convinces the understanding of those who are
bound to act conscientiously upon such proof.
If after an impartial consideration and
comparison of all of the evidence or lack of
evidence in the case you can honestly say
that you are not convinced and satisfied of a
defendant's guilt, you have a reasonable
doubt.
(R. 52, Instruction No. 4).
The first paragraph of the trial court's instruction
consistent with all previously approved reasonable doubt
instructions.

State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1379-80 ("[a]

reasonable doubt is one based on reason"); State v. Johnson, 77
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P.2d at 1145-46 (a reasonable doubt "must arise from the evidence
or lack of evidence in the case"); State v. Tillman/ 750 P.2d
546, 572-73 (Utah 1987) ("by reasonable doubt is meant a doubt
that is based on reason and one which is reasonable in view of
all the evidence").

It also parallels the language held

permissible by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, a circuit
that discourages the giving of any instruction on reasonable
doubt.1

United States v. Hall, 854 F.2d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir.

1988) (the phrase "fair doubt" is "neutral, indicating an
application of fairness;" and, while possibly unhelpful to a
jury's understanding, its use "does not impinge upon the
2
reasonable doubt standard").
The second paragraph of the court's instruction is
exactly the same as that approved of in State v. Tillman, 750
P.2d at 572-573 ("[p]roof beyond a reasonable doubt is that
degree of proof which satisfies the mind and convinces the
understanding of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon
it").

The language was again favorably reviewed in State v.

Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1145-46, where identical language was used
At least two federal circuits have admonished their district
courts not to define reasonable doubt "because often the
definition engenders more confusion than does the term itself",
United States v. Martin-Trigona, 684 F.2d 485, 493 (7th Cir.
1982). Accord United States v. Velazquez, 847 F.2d 140 (4th Cir.
1988). But while discouraged, neither circuit holds it to be
reversible error for a court to instruct a jury as to reasonable
doubt.
2
The First Circuit Court of Appeals has recently instructed its
district courts to discontinue the use of "fair doubt" or any
other redefining or "refining" of reasonable doubt. But in doing
so, the circuit court did not find the use of "fair doubt" to be
reversible error. United States v. Campbell, 874 F.2d 838, 843
(1st Cir. 1989) .
- i **-

in the first sentence of that court's instruction no, 11, which
instruction was criticized on other grounds in the concurring
opinions.

See concurring opinions of J. Stewart and J.

Zimmerman, IdL at 1147 and 1149.
The third paragraph parallels that approved of in State
v. Tillman, 750 P.2d at 572-573 (M[i]f after an impartial
consideration and comparison of all the evidence in the case you
can candidly say that you are not satisfied of the defendant's
guilt, you have a reasonable doubt"); and State v. Johnson, 774
P. 2d at 1145-1146 ("[i]f after an impartial consideration and
comparison of all the evidence, you can honestly say that you are
not satisfied of the defendant's guilt, you have a reasonable
doubt; but if, after such impartial consideration and comparison
of all the evidence, you can truthfully say that you have abiding
conviction of the defendant's guilt such as you would be willing
to act upon in the more weighty and important matters relating to
your own affairs, you have no reasonable doubt").

However, it is

clear that the trial court, knowing the admonition of the Utah
Supreme Court in State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1380, to
discontinue the use of the language "more weighty and important
matters relating to your own affairs," deleted the offending
portion of the Johnson instruction.

As such, this third

paragraph is actually closer to the type of instruction approved
of by Justice Stewart in both his dissent in Ireland, 773 P.2d at
1381, and his concurring opinion in Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1148.
3
The lower court's instruction also conformed substantially with
approved federal form instructions. See Manual of Model Criminal
Jury Instructions for the Ninth Circuit (1989 Ed.), Form

Taken as a whole, it is clear that the court's
instructions to the jury retained the burden of proof on the
state to prove all elements of the charge beyond a reasonable
doubt.

Even if the reasonable doubt instruction had contained

or failed to contain any more appropriate language, such error
would be harmless in light of the totality of the jury
instructions and overwhelming evidence against defendant.

State

v. Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1146, 1149; State v. Knight, 734 P.2d
913, 919-920 (Utah 1987) .
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction
should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /^h

day of March, 1990.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General

Cont.

Instruction No. 3.03, Reasonable Doubt-Defined:
A reasonable doubt is a doubt based upon
reason and common sense, and may arise from a
careful and impartial consideration of all
the evidence, or from lack of evidence.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that
leaves you firmly convinced that the
defendant is guilty.
If after a careful and impartial
consideration with your fellow jurors of all
the evidence, you are not convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is
guilty, it is your duty to find the defendant
not guilty. On the other hand, if after a
careful and impartial consideration with your
fellow jurors of all the evidence, you are
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the
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